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Just as in the 1960s the pessimism about dialectical materialism was giving 
way to a new hope that Marxist dialectics can be amended or augmented by 
Spinoza’s anti-teleological philosophy, a new, seemingly intractable problem 
arose. Namely, the problem that the more one opposes regimes of power, the 
more this opposition strengthens the structural system that makes such regimes 
possible. As Foucault puts this point somewhere: “Anyone who attempts 
to oppose the law in order to found a new order … will encounter the silent 
and infinitely accommodating welcome of the law. The law does not change: 
it subsided into the grave once and for all, and each of its forms is only a 
metamorphosis of that never-ending death.” This problem is even more acute in 
neoliberal governmentality, where it becomes increasingly difficult to identify 
even a target to oppose or resist, given that executive government cedes a lot of 
its power to capital.
This may suggest that optimism of the will in the face of the pessimism of 
the intellect is even more urgent today—and yet such a stance is precarious for 
a Spinozist who would be suspicious not only of any concept of the will but also 
of the very idea of hope, given what Spinoza has to say about the will and about 
hope in his works.
The wager of the present two collections is that we may be better served 
by paying close attention to what Spinoza says about authority. Examining 
Spinoza’s authority in the full range of its significations—as prophetic authority 
or as sovereignty, as power or as authoritative process of interpretation—we 
may be able to evade the dilemma between pessimism and optimism. In fact, 
we may be able to steer a path that shows how resistance is possible because 
authority is ever present as obedience or as the sad emotions that decrease our 
power.
Preface
A. Kiarina Kordela and Dimitris Vardoulakis
We are thankful to all of our contributors as much for the final products that 
appear in the form of these thoughtful essays as for what came before that: 
their enthusiastic engagement in conference panels and workshops that have 
helped us all shape our ideas as we were putting them down in essay forms. 
These events include: the seminar on “Spinoza’s Authority,” organized by 
Dimitris Vardoulakis, which took place at the University of Western Sydney, in 
Sydney, Australia, in August 2012; the thematic stream on “Spinozan Politics” at 
the London Conference on Critical Thought, organized by Filippo Del Lucchese 
and Dimitris Vardoulakis, which took place at the Royal Holloway, University 
of London, in June 2013; the seminar on “Spinoza’s Authority: Resistance and 
Power” at the conference of the American Comparative Literature Association, 
organized by Siarhei Biareishyk and A. Kiarina Kordela, which took place at 
the New York University in New York, in March 2014; and the workshop on 
“Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise,” organized by Stathis Gourgouris and 
Dimitris Vardoulakis, which took place at Columbia University in New York, in 
November 2015.
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References to Spinoza’s works
The various translations of Spinoza’s works offer often significantly different 
interpretation of the meaning of his original Latin text. For this reason, the 
contributors have been free to choose their preferred translation, or to translate 
themselves the Latin from the established text of Spinoza’s works in the Gebhardt 
edition of the Opera.
The following abbreviations of specific works have been used:
E = Ethics [Ethica]
The Roman numeral in capital following E indicates the part of the Ethics. 
For example, E I is Ethics, Part I, E II is Ethics Part II, and so on. The following 










So, for instance, E II, P7 refer to Ethics, Part I, Proposition 7. And, E IV, P34S 
refers to Ethics, Parts IV, Scholium to Proposition 34.
Other abbreviations to Spinoza’s works
TIE  (Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect): cited by paragraph number.
Ep. (The Letters): cited by letter number.




TP (Tractatus Politicus): cited by chapter followed by paragraph number.
TTP (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus).
The contributors indicate in each chapter which edition of the above works they 
prefer to use.

Barely a reader of Spinoza’s Ethics could fail to notice that this work far exceeds the 
scope of its title. Already by reading the first pages we find ourselves enwrapped 
first of all in a theology—and one might add, a secular theology—which quickly 
reveals itself to be simultaneously an ontology and an epistemology, to mention 
only the most eminent subject matters of Spinoza’s rather short book. The first of 
the two volumes of our collection on Spinoza’s Authority brings to the foreground 
another, perhaps less conspicuous, aspect of the Ethics, namely, that it is also a 
work on political philosophy.
The itinerary of the nine essays in this volume could be briefly described 
as follows. (1) We begin with Dimitris Vardoulakis introducing us to two of 
Spinoza’s many unorthodox positions, and specifically his intertwining of 
equality and power, and his politicization of the ontological, with which Spinoza 
opposes the entire Aristotelian tradition of egalitarianism and the assumption of 
an ante-political space. (2) Spinoza’s next heresy concerns his concept of freedom, 
which, as Aurelia Armstrong argues against its liberal political interpretation 
as a product of self-perfection, can emerge only as an effect of internal 
(individual) and external (social) relational interactions. (3) Such interrelations 
between singularity and the common bring us to the issue of conatus, whose 
interconnections with potestas and potentia are unfolded in Cesare Casarino’s 
reading of Gilles Deleuze’s thesis that resistance (potentia) comes before power 
(potestas) through the Spinozan principle that truth is the standard both of itself 
and of the false. (4) One of the most fundamental concerns of potestas and the 
state is legitimacy, which, as Juan Domingo Sánchez Estop shows, in opposition 
to the dominant contractual theories of political legitimacy, Spinoza considers 
to be an effect of the imagination, so that the state has essentially no proper 
existence. (5) The centrality of the imagination to the political culminates in 
Joseph Hughes’ essay which argues, against Alain Badiou, that Spinoza’s method 
Authority in the Ethics: An Introduction
A. Kiarina Kordela
Spinoza’s Authority Volume I2
of proof involves discovery, historicity and the potential of radical retroactive 
reconstitution of sense, so that neither proof nor the political can be reduced 
to mathematical logic. (6) Antonio Negri returns to his distinction between 
potentia as constituent power and potestas as transcendent sovereignty, and to 
his critics, to argue that potentia is a non-teleological productive engine and 
a permanent source of laws that builds virtue from below, and that politics is 
not a mediator but the origin and rupture of society. (7) The same horizontal 
architectonics of power is also reflected in Spinoza’s conception of body and 
mind, which, as Warren Montag shows, opposes the entire Christian-Cartesian 
tradition and its conception of the mind as the master and the body as the slave, 
to raise the question: what can the body do when liberated from the master? 
(8) James Edward Ford III brings the problematic of the master and the slave 
squarely within (post)colonial theory to argue that effective resistance can occur 
not through solitary acts of revenge but through a shared life in the common, 
just as authority manifests itself in sharing power with the multitude. (9) Lastly, 
my essay functions as a bridge to the second volume, as its thesis regarding 
Spinoza’s anticipation of hegemony and biopolitics, including the possibility of 
their radical reconceptualization, is based on both the Ethics and the treatises.
Below are summaries of the essays contained in the present volume.
* * *
In “Equality and Power: Spinoza’s Reformulation of the Aristotelian Tradition of 
Egalitarianism,” Dimitris Vardoulakis argues that Spinoza gives us an alternative 
to Western political philosophy and its Aristotelian conception of “geometric 
equality” which “utilizes a value or merit to determine equality by analogy.” In this 
tradition, authority always privileges one of three types of equality—“procedural, 
material or desertful”—which are always at odds with each other and therefore 
cause “bloody conflict that is destructive of the polis.” Drawing on Spinoza’s 
axiom in his Ethics—“There is no singular thing in Nature than which there is 
not another more powerful and stronger. Whatever one is given, there is another 
more powerful by which the first can be destroyed” (E, IV, A1)—Vardoulakis 
argues that Spinoza “co-posits being and power” and “introduces an inequality 
of power” that entails that “everyone will be overpowered by an external cause.” 
In its affirmation of differential power relations, this axiom denies absolute 
authority itself and opens up “a common space where democracy unfolds 
because of the power interaction of citizens.” This is an “agonistic democracy” 
marked by “an equality in the participation of engagement of contestation.” 
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Vardoulakis’ further target is the “oft-repeated move” in Western political 
philosophy to suppose “an ante-political space of equality” in order to justify 
some form of sovereign authority. Augustine’s Eden, Hobbes’ state of nature, 
and Kant’s kingdom of ends—which correspond to the logics of “three types 
of sovereignty: ancient, modern and biopolitical,” respectively—all represent 
presupposed spaces of absolute equality that help justify their different political 
frameworks. Spinoza rejects this ante-political space because “the political 
is not confined to human relations regulated either by formally instituted 
laws or transcendental laws,” since for Spinoza the ontological is itself already 
political. Therefore, the political “does not require a transcendent authority 
to supervise over…and regulate” itself, “since it is the immanent unfolding of 
power relations.” In Vardoulakis’ conclusion, the “Spinozan position allows for a 
conceptualization of equality which is not dependent on authority, but consists 
rather in the equality of access to participation in the differential unfolding of 
power.”
Aurelia Armstrong’s essay, “Spinoza’s Ethics and Politics of Freedom: Active 
and Passive Power,” critically examines the grounds for the claim made by 
a number of recent liberal political theorists that Spinoza’s conception of 
freedom belongs to a self-perfectionist tradition of autonomy. This claim easily 
dissociates Spinoza’s freedom from politics since it includes as its constitutive 
condition that freedom is achievable only by the individual’s own intellectual 
activity. Armstrong argues that this claim mischaracterizes Spinoza’s conception 
of ethical liberation insofar as it fails to account for the impact of the different 
concrete forms of existence on the way essences exist. While the liberal view 
invites us to imagine freedom as the self-realization of essential power and, thus, 
as a function of the internal causal activity of singular essences considered in 
abstraction from the relations that determine how they operate in existence, the 
alternative view sketched in this essay emphasizes the centrality of relational 
interaction to Spinoza’s account of activity. Armstrong argues that the degree 
of freedom and activity we enjoy as existing individuals must be understood 
as the combined effect of internal causal force and external causes in their 
interactions. Thus, how we are related to one another, whether through relations 
of agreement and mutual support or disagreement and opposition, becomes 
crucial to determining individual and collective prospects for empowerment and 
liberation. The more we manage to agree, Spinoza suggests, the less subject we 
are to the arbitrary power of external things, and consequently, the greater our 
power to act from the necessity of our own natures. In this light, and against the 
liberal interpretation, Armstrong suggests that if we are freer in a state this is not 
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just because the state protects us from relationships that threaten our power, but 
also because a state constitutionally constrained to take the welfare of all citizens 
into account acts positively as a vector for building relationships of agreement, 
which enhance individual and collective power and freedom.
In “Grammars of Conatus: or, on the Primacy of Resistance in Spinoza, 
Foucault, and Deleuze,” Cesare Casarino illuminates Gilles Deleuze’s formula 
that “the final word on power is that resistance comes first”—that is, before 
power—by tracing the relationship between resistance and power in the Ethics. 
Just as “truth is the standard both of itself and of falsity,” “resistance,” Casarino 
argues, “is the standard of itself and of power.” To locate the concept of resistance 
in Spinoza (since it is not explicitly stated), Casarino turns to conatus, “the 
striving to persevere in one’s being.” The question then becomes: “What being 
is at stake in such a perseverance?” In Spinoza, being has two facets, essence 
and existence, and because on the level of modes, the two do not coincide, 
being is the non-identity of essence and existence. Conatus is the striving to 
persevere, “against all odds,” in the non-identity of essence and existence, and 
it is this striving that invests and constitutes the realms of the ethical and the 
political. Further, Casarino argues, “essence is singularity”—hence “to each its 
own conatus”—while existence is common—“we can never bring it about that 
we need nothing outside ourselves to preserve our being”—so that conatus 
has also always “included the outside and the common as its own condition of 
possibility.” Having established the above, Casarino is then able to describe the 
three aspects of conatus. (1) The first is the “form of relation,” in other words, 
“the historical formations, or ‘social field,’ which in this case bear the name of 
mercantile capital.” (2) The second aspect of conatus involves a “relation of force 
expressed as power,” or potestas, which aligns with “capitalist exchange relations,” 
relations among “modes of thought and modes of extension.” (3) Finally, conatus 
involves a “relation of force expressed as resistance,” or potentia, the singular 
essence which always “comes first” insofar as it operates on the level of the “entire 
plane of immanence,” or the “absolute outside.” This third aspect of conatus, or 
resistance, is realized via Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge, “intuition,” which is 
“knowledge from the standpoint of eternity,” that is, outside of time, so that here 
“the striving to persevere in one’s being turns into the striving to resist.” Thus, 
resistance (potentia), operating under the species of eternity, is both first and last 
in the formula of power.
In “Beyond Legitimacy: The State as an Imaginary Entity in Spinoza’s 
Political Ontology,” Juan Domingo Sánchez Estop takes as his starting point 
Antonio Negri’s distinction between two lines in modern political philosophy, 
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the one being predicated on a transcendent conception of legitimacy, the other 
viewing legitimacy as an imaginary effect of real power. The former constitutes 
the “mainstream tradition of Western political philosophy, from Hobbes to 
Hegel, through Locke and Rousseau,” which “sought to produce a consistent 
theory of legitimate power and legitimate obedience based on the concepts of 
consent, legal power, authority and legitimacy.” Spinoza, belonging to the other 
line of thought along with Machiavelli and Marx, can be seen as a reversal of 
this logic, in his claim that “authority is not the basis for legitimate potestas, but 
an effect and a means of the actual exercise of potestas, that is, of the production 
of obedience.” Drawing further on Louis Althusser, Sánchez Estop argues that 
for Spinoza, “the most effective power is the one founded on the subjects’ inner 
obedience,” and that “power generates its legitimacy not by means of its action 
on subjects but through the production of subjects.” Crucial to the production 
of subjects is the imaginary, a concept which in Spinoza is intimately tied to the 
political insofar as “law, power and obedience” are “needed in order to correct 
the effect of human passions” which are “rooted in imagination” rather than 
reason. In Spinoza, Sánchez Estop concludes, political legitimacy is the “product 
of imagination, as a necessary illusion produced by political power, as a means 
to reproduce its constitutive relations of force.” Concomitantly, the state is not 
“constitutive of the political community,” rather it is the “result of the imaginary 
transformation of a social relation into a substance through the common 
mechanisms of imagination,” and therefore “has no proper existence”—a 
position that, as Sánchez Estop shows, Spinoza shares with Marx.
In “The Cold Quietness of the Stars: Proof, Rhetoric and the Authority of 
Reason in the Ethics,” Joe Hughes engages with and critiques Alain Badiou’s 
“movement from a mathematics of proof to a logical politics,” that is, the 
intention “to perform a transfer of the authority of reason from the sphere of 
mathematical rationality to that of practical and political rationality.” While 
Badiou, following Descartes’ interpretation of the geometrical method, claims in 
his “What is a Proof in Spinoza’s Ethics?” that “a proof explains the proposition 
in terms of what has gone before,” that is, what is already known, Hughes argues 
that to attend to a proof is “to notice that it is not merely a recuperative gesture 
which becomes clear only after everything is already known.” Rather, for Spinoza, 
attending to a proof requires “an inescapable apprenticeship through which 
thought learns to create.” Hughes grounds his thesis on an attentive comparison 
of Spinoza’s conception of method to its respective conceptualizations by the two 
major figures between which he is historically situated, Descartes and Leibniz. 
This comparison reveals that Spinoza’s concept of proof exceeds the “merely 
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logical proof ” because it includes an inventive dimension, an aspect of thought 
“which constituted for a long time the zone of indiscernibility between rhetoric 
and philosophy.” For Spinoza, true ideas “can only be discovered, in so far as 
they are invented, and once invented they will ground, at a later stage of history, 
the discovery of still more.” This means, Hughes continues, that for Spinoza, 
(1) method “has a history which is the history of invention,” (2) “science must 
be invented,” (3) both reading and demonstrating are “discovery,” and—what is 
presupposed for the above three—(4) “there is a temporality to the process of 
demonstration,” because of which “there always persists, in any given utterance, 
a horizon of potentiality, specifically the potentiality for radical, perhaps savage, 
future specification.” In short, Hughes historicizes proof and method in the 
most Spinozan and psychoanalytic sense, that is, he shows that the temporality 
of demonstration is not linear—proceeding from one known to the next—but 
rather involves retroactivity—bringing a present known back to a past unknown 
so as to render it known and available to future specifications. This is why “the 
movement of proof is never only repetition” of the known—as is conceived in 
canonical logic, Descartes and Badiou—“but difference as well.” Against the 
mathematizing “fantasy that the proof can be formalized” in the form of letters 
or other symbols “and clarified by virtue of deductive relations between them,” 
Hughes proposes that a Spinozan “practical and political rationality” should 
embrace the inventive dimension involved in its demonstrations.
In “Spinoza: A Different Power to Act,” Antonio Negri begins with five 
theses which attempt to differentiate Spinoza’s conception of constituent 
power (potentia) from the traditional notion of transcendent power 
(sovereignty/potestas), especially in its political application. First, Negri argues 
that “it is impossible to reduce Spinoza’s concept of power to the individual, 
or to the individual power to act,” so that Spinozan power differs in that “it is 
socially constituted, and innovates on simple interaction, being always oriented 
toward the common.” Second, this constituent power cannot be analyzed with 
the “various forms of transcendental understanding of power,” but rather 
falls into the “excessively monistic perspective” of accumulation. Thus, the 
“positive identity of [constituent] power and right can’t be reduced to a positivist 
perspective,” because, unlike an actualized legal system, power as potentia is 
productive. Third, Spinozan power is non-teleological despite the fact that “the 
defence of freedom […] represents the telos for [Spinozan] thought and politics.” 
Fourth, potentia is different from potestas in that it is marked by an excess of “the 
rational expression of amor,” which itself is produced by the movement from 
conatus to cupiditas (desire); cupiditas is the core of this movement in that it 
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produces the imagination, which, in turn, “leads the singularity from resistance 
to the common.” Lastly, Negri concludes, “politics is not the mediator of society, 
but its permanent origin as well as its continual rupture” because of a consistent 
surplus of constituent power which perpetually “opposes nothingness and 
builds the common.” Negri’s description of potentia (and politics) is followed by 
his responses to past and anticipated criticisms. First, he responds to the critique 
that he has “created an absolute antinomy between potentia (ontologically 
creative) and potestas (fixed and/or parasitical),” claiming that their relationship 
is rather “a continuously produced struggle, a conflict that keeps being posited 
and resolved,” and in which “potentia, as cupiditas, is never bad, and is always 
excessive.” Next, Negri responds to the criticism that his advocated program of 
absolute democracy would be an “undue interruption of the continuous process 
of conflict among singularities,” as postulated by Spinoza. Rather, absolute 
democracy is necessarily constituted by potentia insofar as “a constitution 
is an engine and not a result, it is a ‘constituent power’ as permanent source 
of laws.” Negri further avoids teleological guarantees by rejecting a utopian 
destination for the common and arguing, instead, that “the multitude, and not 
us, has to decide what it wants to be.” Thus, Negri is able to conclude that what 
differentiates Spinozan potentia from theories of sovereign power is that “it 
builds virtue from below.”
In “Commanding the Body: The Language of Subjection in Ethics III, P2S,” 
Warren Montag argues that the ultimate function of the proposition and scholium 
in question lies in revealing the very “prejudices” because of which their explicit 
message had to remain non-apprehensible to Spinoza’s contemporary readers. 
With Montag, Spinoza takes the term “prejudice” in its literal, legal sense, as a 
judgment already made as the very precondition for everything that follows. 
Far from being simply errors or purely imaginary, “prejudices” iterate previous 
judgments that are now materialized within the existing practice of law, and 
are, thus, co-extensive with each historical society and its specific apparatuses 
of subjection—in Spinoza’s case, the line from Christianity to the seventeenth 
century. Apostle Paul encapsulates the logic of this apparatus as follows: “do you 
not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you and that you 
are God’s and not your own?” Descartes reiterates this dictum in his declaration 
of the mind as the dominus that decrees its servus, the body, with benevolent 
God crowning this cosmic hierarchy. For Spinoza’s imaginary interlocutors, 
the body can no more engage in the work of production without a master than 
the actual slave seized in Palestine in the first century or in West Africa in the 
seventeenth. Against this Christian-Cartesian tradition, Spinoza dares to raise 
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the revolutionary question—what is the body capable of doing when it is liberated 
from the master’s command?—with E III, P2: “the body cannot determine the 
mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to movement or rest.” This 
statement cuts the Gordian knot of causality between body and mind—in which 
the lines of individuality, freedom, accountability, guilt, authority and subjection 
are so entangled as to seem inseparable and inescapable—thereby obliterating 
the theoretical opposition of command and obedience on both levels, mind and 
body and political authority and people. The “absolute sovereignty” of the mind 
is impossible, nothing more than a “forensic” fantasy that renders us “absolutely” 
accountable for affects and actions—including, crucially, (not)remembering—
that we cannot entirely control; and the same fantasy conceives of political 
power as “absolute sovereignty.” The demolition of this fantasy constitutes 
Spinoza’s Machiavellianism. The scholium’s intertwining of the lexica of natural 
philosophy, causality, legislation, military and politics, entails a Moebius-strip-type 
relation among nature, humans and politics, whereby the outside folds back 
upon itself as its own interior, and thus reminds us that, irrespective of their 
truth, “beliefs” produce real effects.
In “Interrupting the System: Spinoza and Maroon Thought,” James Edward 
Ford III disputes Antonio Negri’s hypothesis that a “certain black and leprous 
Brazilian” in Spinoza’s “unpleasant dream” is Caliban from The Tempest. Rather, 
Ford III argues, the Maroon is “a more effective figure for hypothesizing about 
Spinoza’s dream, his materialist shift, and the global reach of the multitude.” The 
Maroon—“an African who has joined a community of other Africans escaping 
enslavement in the New World”—complements Spinoza’s active immanent 
materialism, whereas “Caliban symbolizes individual acts of the subordinated 
that remain mired in what Franz Fanon would call ressentiment,” and his defiance 
“works strictly within the confines Prospero [his master] has set.” Furthermore, 
Caliban, a solitary figure, “dreams of but does not pursue a shared life in the 
common,” and “will forego freedom for revenge because, as Spinoza says, 
revenge is the slave’s modus operandi.” By contrast, the Maroon productively and 
resolutely reaches for “a new sociability,” and his active “remaking” potentiality, 
like Spinoza’s own excommunication, constitutes a historical actualization 
of Spinoza’s ontology. As Ford concludes, “Spinoza’s authority manifests in 
sharing power with the multitude, which cannot be fully understood without 
understanding racial complexity,” and, in light of “the resurgence of fascist 
elements,” along with the persistence of global capitalism and its effects, it is an 
imperative “to rethink authority.”
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A. Kiarina Kordela approaches Spinoza’s conceptualization of political power 
as a system that negotiates authority and freedom in ways that parallel his 
theological distinction between fearful obedience to biblical laws and the love 
for God. She shows that this intertwining of authority and freedom anticipates 
modern hegemonic and biopolitical forms of power, while, importantly, offering 
insights into biopower that far exceed its hitherto theorizations. By being 
predicated on a monistic relation between Body and Mind, as well as on the 
third kind of knowledge—as the kind of knowledge in which the Mind conceives 
of itself and the Body sub specie aeternitatis—Spinoza’s conception of biopower 
reveals that its object extends beyond the biophysical body (Foucault) or “bare 
life” (Agamben)—which are modes of substance—to include Body and Mind 
as attributes of substance and, hence, as eternal. Linking Spinoza’s substance 
to Marx’s labor-power (the potential of labor to actualize itself) Kordela 
suggests that in capitalist modernity it is substance itself that is politicized, as 
it is commodified, thereby becoming an object of political economy. From then 
on, biopower can, and must, constitute itself as a form of power that directly 
intervenes in the relationship of the human being to eternity, while also setting 
in motion that modern biopolitical mechanism which triggers the slippage from 
eternity to its distorted underside: the secular fantasy of immortality.
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